Complex Adaptive Peacemaking: How Systems Theory Reveals Advantages of Traditional Tribal Dispute Resolution by Okulski, Juliana E.
American Indian Law Journal 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 6 
1-24-2017 
Complex Adaptive Peacemaking: How Systems Theory Reveals 
Advantages of Traditional Tribal Dispute Resolution 
Juliana E. Okulski 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Okulski, Juliana E. (2017) "Complex Adaptive Peacemaking: How Systems Theory Reveals Advantages of 
Traditional Tribal Dispute Resolution," American Indian Law Journal: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj/vol5/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Journal by 
an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
Complex Adaptive Peacemaking: How Systems Theory Reveals Advantages of 
Traditional Tribal Dispute Resolution 
Cover Page Footnote 
*University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected May, 2016. The author wishes to thank Troy Eid 
and Jan G. Laitos for their assistance in reviewing this article. 
This article is available in American Indian Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj/vol5/iss1/6 
263 
 
COMPLEX ADAPTIVE PEACEMAKING: HOW SYSTEMS 
THEORY REVEALS ADVANTAGES OF TRADITIONAL 
TRIBAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
 





I. DUAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY..........................267 
A. Origins of the Western Legal Tradition in Tribal Justice 
Systems .............................................................................268 
II. THE WESTERN ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ..........................273 
A. Distinct Methods of Operation.............................................273 
B. Underlying Narrative ........................................................275 
C. Principal Values ................................................................276 
D. Assumptions Underlying Adversary System ......................278 
E. Collateral Effects ...............................................................279 
III. PEACEMAKING: NAVAJO PEACEMAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY ..282 
A. Method of Operation of Navajo Peacemaking......................284 
1. Cooperation Not Competition ........................................284 
2. Consensual Agreement Between Parties .....................286 
3. Flexible Framework for Dispute Resolution ...................287 
a. Underlying Narrative .............................................290 
b. Principal Values.....................................................291 
c. Assumptions Underlying Adversary System ...........292 
d. Collateral Effects ...................................................294 
IV. DUELING DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS AND COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THEORY ...................................................296 
A. Two Distinct Dispute Resolution Systems .............................296 
B. Using Complex Adaptive Systems Theory to Analyze Competing 
Dispute Resolution Methods ..............................................298 
1. Overview of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory ...........298 
2. Application of CAS Theory to the Adversary and 
Peacemaking Systems .............................................302 






COMPLEX ADAPTIVE PEACEMAKING: HOW SYSTEMS 
THEORY REVEALS ADVANTAGES OF TRADITIONAL 
TRIBAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS 
 




Many contemporary tribal communities have two distinct 
justice systems capable of resolving interpersonal civil disputes 
among tribal members. 2 The systems are grounded in different 
justice paradigms, and as a result utilize very different procedures 
for dispute resolution. One system is based on the Western, or 
Anglo-American, paradigm of justice and resolves conflict through 
litigation or other adversarial dispute resolution methods. 3  For 
example, Indian tribal courts, which were modeled largely on 
American courts, historically have resolved disputes by employing 
some degree of the Western adversarial ideals of justice. 4 The 
Western paradigm of justice prioritizes and seeks to protect 
individual rights above all else. More recently, however, many 
tribes have rediscovered or formally instituted traditional tribal 
methods of dispute resolution, generally referred to as 
“peacemaking,” 5 and are now also resolving interpersonal civil 
disputes pursuant to traditional tribal justice principles as well.6 
The “tribal peacemaking” concept has been defined as “any system 
of dispute resolution used within a Native American community 
which utilizes non-adversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates 
some traditional or customary approaches . . . the aim of which is 
                                                                                                                            
1 University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected May, 2016. The 
author wishes to thank Troy Eid and Jan G. Laitos for their assistance in 
reviewing this article.  
2 Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary 
Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 502 (2002). 
3 Id. 
4  Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: 
How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 237 (1997). 
5 William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to 
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal 
Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 578-79 (2000); 
Porter, supra note 4, at 250-51.   








conciliation and restoration of peace and harmony.”7 Unlike the 
Western system of justice, in which individual rights are 
paramount, peacemaking primarily aims to repair relationships 
among individuals and to restore community harmony. Unlike the 
Anglo-American paradigm, traditional tribal dispute resolution 
procedures are fairly informal and typically proceed outside of 
tribal court.8   
While from the outside, this dual system seems to do no more 
than provide tribal members with options regarding where they 
want to settle their civil disputes, a number of scholars find the 
dual system more problematic. Some scholars argue that because 
the adversary system promotes values—such as individualism—
that are antithetical to tribal values, employment of Western justice 
systems tears at the fabric of tribal communities and undermines 
tribal sovereignty.9 These scholars argue that tribes should rely less 
on the Western-influenced tribal court system, and instead rely 
more on traditional, informal dispute resolution techniques, such as 
peacemaking, which reflect and promote tribal values.10 However, 
other scholars believe just the opposite. This latter group of 
scholars strongly believes that strengthening the current model of 
tribal courts, and tribal courts’ use of Western legal traditions, will 
help guarantee tribal sovereignty.11 These scholars argue that tribal 
independence and self-government necessitate state and federal 
recognition of tribal court judgments.12 This recognition requires 
that tribal courts have legitimacy, which can only come from 
adhering to certain Western legal traditions.13 
These scholars’ opposing positions frame a policy debate, at 
the root of which is a question regarding how tribes can resolve 
disputes among members in a manner that best benefits tribal 
                                                                                                                            
7 Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of 
Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 835 (1996). 
8 Porter, supra note 3, at 257.  
9 Id. at 237-38.  
10 See Justice Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the 
Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351 (2011). 
11 Clarkson, supra note 1, at 509.  
12 Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law 24 N.M. 
L. REV. 225225, 242 (1994).  








communities and members. This article considers this question and 
takes the position that tribal communities can best be served by 
relying primarily on peacemaking techniques, rather than the 
Western-style adversarial litigation, for resolving interpersonal 
civil disputes. Unlike the perspectives considered above, however, 
this article does not use policy to support its conclusion that tribes 
should actively seek to emphasize peacemaking as the preferred 
dispute resolution technique. Instead, this conclusion is based on 
mainly functional grounds, that is, how the Western adversarial 
tradition compares in efficacy to the peacemaking system for 
resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Because the peacemaking 
system is far more adapted to the dynamics of human social 
systems, such as tribes, this article concludes that peacemaking is a 
more effective civil dispute resolution tool for tribes. 
This article is premised on two assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that, while the policy behind choosing a dispute 
resolution system is important, what is equally important is that the 
dispute resolution procedure employed by tribes be effective at 
resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Dispute resolution 
procedures that are effective at resolving interpersonal civil 
disputes are particularly crucial for tribes, whose long-term 
endurance depends on the maintenance of community cohesion.14 
Second, it is assumed that the most effective dispute resolution 
system will be the system that is best adapted to the dynamics 
governing human social systems. Based upon these two premises, 
this article uses complex adaptive systems theory to assess the 
relative effectiveness of the two dispute resolution procedures in 
terms of their adaptability to the dynamics governing the behaviors 
of complex human social systems. Ultimately, this article 
concludes that because traditional, tribal dispute resolution 
procedures are better adapted to human social systems, they are 
more effective at actually resolving interpersonal civil disputes. 
Therefore, traditional, tribal dispute resolution procedures 
                                                                                                                            
14 Gretchen Ulrich, Widening the Circle: Adapting Traditional Indian Dispute 
Resolution Methods to Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Restorative Justice in Modern Communities, 20 Hamline J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 








strengthen tribal communities in ways that Western adversarial 
dispute resolution procedures cannot. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines how tribes 
came to employ dual justice systems with such widely diverging 
concepts of justice. Part II analyzes various aspects of the Western 
adversarial system that are employed in many tribal courts. Part II 
also examines the unique procedures used in adversarial litigation 
and the values and assumptions underlying this Anglo-American 
approach to resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Part III engages 
in a similar examination of the Peacemaking system. While 
peacemaking techniques vary significantly from tribe to tribe, Part 
III specifically focuses on the peacemaking procedures employed 
by the Navajo Nation as a model example of how peacemaking 
proceeds. Part IV outlines and explains systems theory principles 
that are relevant to human social system dynamics and explains 
how human social systems, such as Indian tribes, operate as 
complex adaptive systems. Part IV then analyzes both the Western 
adversarial and peacemaking systems, in light of the insights 
provided from complex adaptive systems theory, to determine 
which system best comports with the dynamics governing human 
social systems. Ultimately, the article concludes that because 
peacemaking employs methods that are far more adapted to the 
principle dynamics governing human social systems, peacemaking 
is a more effective dispute resolution system. From a systems 
theory perspective, this article concludes that because it is likely 
more effective at resolving disputes, a greater use of peacemaking 
could better strengthen tribal communities than primarily relying 
on the adversarial system to resolve interpersonal civil disputes.  
 
DISCUSSION 
I. DUAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
The dual justice system present in many tribes today is a Post-
Columbian phenomena directly resulting from American 
colonization.15 Prior to colonization, most Indian tribes relied on a 
                                                                                                                            








single traditional or customary system of law that was “derived 
from rules of conduct and attitudes of the mind concerning their 
kinship system.” 16  Because Indian law was a function of oral 
tradition, colonists encountering the Indians erroneously concluded 
that tribes had no law or justice. Consequently, a significant part of 
the American assimilation program was to impose Western justice 
traditions, such as the adversarial system, on Indian tribes.17 The 
following part provides a chronology of the major federal actions 
that led to the utilization of Western justice practices by Indian 
tribes. 
 
A. Origins of the Western Legal Tradition in Tribal Justice Systems 
The incorporation of the Anglo-American adversarial justice 
paradigm into tribal justice systems can be traced to the political 
backlash that followed the 1881 Supreme Court case Ex parte Kan-
gi-shun-ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog).18 Prior to Crow Dog, 
tribes’ justice systems remained fairly intact, except that that tribes 
had virtually no jurisdiction over non-Indians. 19  In particular, 
tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by one 
Indian against another Indian. 20  However, in Crow Dog, the 
federal government decided to test these jurisdictional limits by 
asserting jurisdiction over an Indian who was accused of 
murdering another Indian.21  
Crow Dog was a member of the Brule tribe who was accused 
of shooting and killing a political rival and fellow Brule tribal 
member named Spotted Tail.22 A day after the shooting, the tribal 
council ordered an end to the fighting that had followed the killing, 
and initiated dispute resolution procedures designed to reconcile 
the families involved.23 After a traditional peacemaking ceremony, 
                                                                                                                            
16 Bradford, supra note 4, at 565.  
17 See Jessica Metoui, Returning to the Circle: The Reemergence of Traditional 
Dispute Resolution in Native American Communities, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 517, 
518 (2007). 
18 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
19 Bradford, supra note 4, at 568.  
20 Id.  
21 See Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556.  









the family of Spotted Tail agreed to accept payment from Crow 
Dog of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to resolve the dispute.24   
Despite the resolution reached by the tribal council, unsatisfied 
federal officials arrested Crow Dog and tried him under federal law 
for murder in the federal Territorial Court of South Dakota.25 The 
federal court subsequently found Crow Dog guilty of murder and 
sentenced him to death. 26  However, Crow Dog appealed his 
conviction on the grounds that the federal court ruling was invalid 
for lack of jurisdiction.27 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed 
the conviction.28 The court supported its decision by noting that 
the treaties between the tribe and the federal government in effect 
at that time gave the tribe a preeminent right to exercise their own 
methods, and resolve disputes internally within the tribe, without 
United States interference.29  
Reeling from the result in Crow Dog, Congress undertook the 
goal of eliminating the “savage quality” of tribal law in order to 
impose “white man’s morality.”30 To achieve these ends, Congress 
passed the Major Crimes Act,31 which extended federal criminal 
jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians on 
reservations regardless of the status of their victims.32 In addition, 
the United States Department of the Interior, the federal agency 
responsible for Indian affairs, began to develop court systems on 
Indian reservations, referred to as the Courts of Indian Offenses or 
“C.F.R. Courts.” 33  Ultimately, these courts enforced federal 
regulations designed to extinguish tribal culture and tribal legal 
systems, and were part of Congress’s overarching Indian policy of 
assimilation. 34 
                                                                                                                            
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 See Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  
30 Bradford, supra note 4, at 570.  
31 Major Crimes Act, Act of March 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.  
32 Bradford, supra note 4, at 570-71.  
33 Justice Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the Modern 
Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (2011). 








C.F.R. Courts operated under the Anglo-American justice 
paradigm and handled less serious criminal actions as well as 
disputes among tribal members.35 Many of the judges of C.F.R. 
Courts were the local Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs 
superintendents whose primary objective was to further 
assimilationist ideals and to suppress any activities that interfered 
with the integration goal. 36  The courts largely failed to reflect 
Indian values and customs. Instead, the courts utilized the 
adversarial model, and were designed to change tribal values into 
those of American civilized society.37 
Traditional tribal justice systems were again subjected to 
Western influence in 1934 with the passage of the Federal Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA).38 The IRA, or “Indian New Deal,” was 
a reflection of a remarkable sea change by Congress in regards to 
its Indian policy. Rather than attempting to assimilate and integrate 
Indians into American society, the IRA aimed to strengthen and 
encourage tribal sovereignty and self-government.39 While the act 
aimed to revitalize tribes, such that they would reassume 
responsibility for their own affairs, ultimately the act’s passage 
resulted in the tribes further incorporating Western ideas of justice 
into their legal systems.40 
The IRA provided that any tribe that adopted its provisions 
could establish a constitutional form of government that would be 
recognized by the United States.41 The IRA gave tribes the option 
of adopting constitutions based on boilerplate provisions included 
in the IRA. 42  In response, nearly 200 tribes adopted IRA 
constitutions.43 The IRA “form” constitutions deviated from the 
                                                                                                                            
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461-70; Bradford, supra note 4, at 
572-73.  
39 Mathew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 
NEB. L. REV. 121, 141 (2006). 
40 Bradford, supra note 4, at 573. 
41 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 
96, COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832 (1996).  
42 Id.  
43 Jason P. Hipp, Rethinking Rewriting: Tribal Constitutional Amendment and 








federal constitution in a number of respects. Notably, they did not 
provide for an independent judiciary or for separation of powers.44 
In response to this omission, tribes took legislative action and 
established their own tribal judiciaries. These tribal judiciaries 
were modeled after the form and structure of the Anglo-American 
court system, and instituted the adversarial system for resolving 
disputes.45  Because of their foreign model and structure, tribal 
judges were forced to borrow extensively from both American 
substantive and procedural law.46  
Tribal justice systems were further subjected to Western 
influence when, in 1954, Congress passed another law that resulted 
in the Westernization of tribal justice systems. Public Law 280 was 
an outgrowth of yet another development in congressional Indian 
policy, aptly referred to as the “termination era.” 47 During the 
termination era, Congress was primarily concerned with 
terminating federal responsibility for Indian tribes’ welfare. 48  
Public Law 280 sought to further this goal by establishing a system 
of concurrent jurisdiction between the state and tribal court 
systems. 49  The law vested state courts with civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over causes of action involving Indians, arising on 
Indian lands, and extending to state criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian lands located within state lines. 50  While the law was 
mandatory in only a handful of states, it provided that any other 
state could unilaterally accept jurisdiction over Indian lands 
located within its borders.51 
One effect of the concurrent jurisdiction established by Public 
Law 280 was that jurisdiction over a case was determined by 
                                                                                                                            
44 Id. at 80-82; Valencia Weber, supra note 8, at 236.  
45 See Margery H. Brown, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development 
of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1991). 
46 Fletcher, supra note 37, at 739.  
47  Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public 
Defenders, 13 FALL- KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 141 (2003).  
48 Vanessa J. Jiménez, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public 
Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1661 (1998). 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Julie A. Pace, Enforcement of Tribal Law in Federal Court: Affirmation of 
Indian Sovereignty or a Step Back Towards Assimilation, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J.435, 








where the action was first filed – tribal or state court. Access to the 
state courts had the effect of putting competitive pressure on tribal 
courts to keep up with state laws and procedures.52 Consequently, 
in order to not be rendered obsolete by the state courts, tribal 
courts abandoned a number of their traditional procedures and 
processes in favor of adopting those analogous to state systems.53 
In their attempts to keep up, tribes further adopted adversarial 
methods of dispute resolution.54 
By the 1960’s Congress had changed directions again 
regarding its Indian policy. Fueled by the civil rights movement, 
Congress began to focus on the civil rights of Indians. 55  
Addressing the reality that the Indian nations were not subject to 
the federal constitution or the Bill of Rights, Congress passed the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 56  The ICRA introduced a 
jurisprudence of individual rights within tribal courts, which 
caused tribes to abandon traditional value systems, based on 
collective wellbeing and community harmony, in exchange for 
value systems reflective of individualism. 57  From the Indian 
perspective, a number of the fundamental rights guarantees were 
foreign to traditional methods of Indian dispute resolution. Tribal 
traditions of fairness and community justice were soon replaced by 
concerns with the values embraced by the adversary system, such 
as due process, equal protection, the right to a speedy trial, etc.58 
Ultimately, the ICRA, like the Major Crimes Act, the IRA, and 
Public Law 280, required tribes to adopt a number of Anglo-
American justice procedures and resulted in instilling adversarial 
litigation methods into tribal justice systems. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
52 Porter, supra note 3, at 270.  
53 Id.  
54 Bradford, supra note 4, at 573.  
55 Id. at 573-74.  
56  Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, Stat. 77 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994); Bradford, supra note 3, 
at 574.  
57 Bradford, supra note 4, at 574-75.  
58  Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision for a 









II. THE WESTERN ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
Today, the majority of disputes in Indian country are still 
resolved in tribal courts employing some degree of the Western 
adversarial principles of adjudication.59 Even though tribal courts 
have begun reincorporating customary substantive law and made 
various procedural adjustments in adjudicatory dispute 
resolution,60 the majority of tribal courts employing the adversary 
system remain faithful to the general rules governing the process.61 
Adversarial justice systems inside and outside tribal courts have a 
common method of operations that reflects a specific narrative 
about how justice is achieved. Additionally, Western adversarial 
tradition reflects specific values as a result of certain fundamental 
assumptions regarding the nature of humans and human societies. 
The following section provides an overview of the major features 
of adversarial justice that trial courts still utilize today. 
 
A. Distinct Methods of Operation 
The adversary system operates differently than other civil 
dispute resolution processes in three main respects. 62 First, the 
adversary system requires party presentation of the evidence in a 
competitive rather than cooperative setting.63 Competition is key to 
the effectiveness of the adversary system, and numerous 
procedural rules are designed to ensure both that the requisite 
threshold level of competition has been met and that the process is 
as competitive as possible. 64  For example, constitutional and 
prudential standing rules are designed to serve these ends. The 
assumption that only the person directly affected by the dispute 
                                                                                                                            
59 Metoui, supra note 15, 518. 
60 Austin, supra note 8, at 362.  
61 Metoui, supra note 15, at 519-20. 
62  Paul T. Wangerin, The Political and Economic Roots of the “Adversary 
System” of Justice and “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 203, 203-05 (1994). 
63 Id. at 205.  
64 Michael Dominic Meuti, Legalistic Individualism: An Alternative Analysis of 









will be sufficiently interested in the dispute to provide the 
sharpness of conflict required for a judicial decision, excludes 
family members or friends of a litigant from participating in the 
dispute resolution process, even if they experience substantial 
secondary effects as a result of the dispute.  
Second, in an adversarial system, the responsibility for 
investigating, authenticating, and presenting evidence falls solely 
on the individual disputants, while a neutral fact finder is tasked 
with issuing a final decision regarding the dispute. 65  In many 
respects, the adversary system affords disputing parties enormous 
amounts of power. Litigants alone, decide the evidence and 
arguments the court will hear. Judges or fact-finders do not 
participate in investigation of the evidence or the formulation of 
accurate legal arguments. Consequently, judges do not probe 
beyond a witness’s veneer in order to assess credibility beyond 
spoken assertions, nor will a judge offer up a different perspective 
on the governing law not raised by the parties. Instead, the judge or 
fact-finder’s role is limited to objectively evaluating the evidence 
presented, and applying established legal principles to the facts in 
order to reach a decision that will govern the outcome of the 
dispute.66  
While the judge or fact-finder’s role may be limited, it is 
nevertheless exclusive. Individual disputants play no role in 
determining the outcome of the dispute, beyond presenting their 
version of events during the trial.67 Once all the evidence has been 
presented, the neutral decision-maker determines how the dispute 
will be resolved without input from the parties. 68  Because the 
parties cannot participate in crafting a solution, the adversary 
system in some respects circumscribes disputants’ control over the 
conflict. The requirement that a judge or jury be impartial is 
critical given the disputants’ exclusion from the decision-making 
process. Neutrality of the judge or jury is essential to ensure both 
                                                                                                                            
65 Wangerin, supra note 60, at 204.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 204-05.  








the evenhanded consideration of each case and the appearance of 
fairness.69  
The third distinguishing feature of the adversary system is that 
it employs a highly structured forensic procedure.70 Elaborate sets 
of rules govern the pretrial and post-trial periods, the trial itself, 
and the behavior of both those representing the disputants and the 
judges.71 The rules of procedure produce a climactic confrontation 
between the parties in a trial that the neutral decision-maker 
observes and from which it makes its decision resolving the 
dispute. 72  The procedural rules also function to distill the 
amorphous cloud of conflict into discrete, workable legal 
components, or issues. The evidence rules are designed to keep the 
trial fair and to narrowly focus the legal issues in dispute.73 These 
rules prohibit unfairly prejudicial evidence and exclude evidence 
that is irrelevant to the legal aspects of the conflict.74 Because the 
highly competitive nature of a trial promotes a win-at-all-cost 
attitude, the adversary system employs a set of ethical rules to 
control the behavior of the disputants and their representatives.75 
Operating together, these rules create a framework providing for a 
narrow focus and rigid order in the dispute resolution process.76  
 
B. Underlying Narrative 
 
The system’s design reflects a narrative about how justice is 
best achieved. The narrative behind the adversary system is 
summarized as follows: Justice is achieved when an impartial 
decision-maker decides the outcome of a dispute based upon the 
application of discrete and established legal principles to the 
                                                                                                                            
69 Stephen A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary 
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 737-738 (1983). 
70 Wangerin, supra note 60, at 204-05.  
71 Landsman, supra note 67, 716-17.  
72 Id. at 716.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 717.  
76 Gerold W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court 








factual truths of a disputed situation. 77 The truth of a disputed 
situation is reached not through cooperation between the parties, 
but by orchestrating a clash between the parties’ respective 
interests and arguments. 78  Because only individuals who are 
personally involved in a particular dispute will have the incentive 
to proffer the best arguments in resolving the dispute, the 
disputants themselves must be responsible for gathering all of the 
available evidence and formulating the arguments thereon. 79  
Consequently, the judge, other agents of government, or those not 
directly involved in the dispute must stay out of the process of 
investigation and argument formulation.80 The judge or fact-finder 
is concerned only with making an objective and enforceable 
decision based upon applying established legal principles to the 
truth of the case.81 In order to keep the game fair at all times and to 
protect the truth from being distorted by overzealous self-
advocacy, extensive procedural and evidentiary rules must govern 
all stages of the process.82  
 
C. Principal Values 
 
The adversary system reflects and seeks to further a distinct set 
of values. Because the system is designed to maintain a free 
society in which individual rights are central,83 the system places a 
high, if not the highest, value on protecting individual rights.84 
Within the system, individual rights are given priority over both 
governmental interests and community rights.85 Various aspects of 
the system reflect a preference for individual over governmental 
interests. The process confers broad authority on the disputing 
parties while strictly limiting the role of the judge or the fact-
                                                                                                                            
77 Meuti, supra note 62, at 337. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Wangerin, supra note 60, at 203-04.  
81 Id.  
82 Meuti, supra note 62 at 337-38. 
83 Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. 
REV. 57, 57 (1998).  
84 Meuti, supra note 62, at 339.  








finder. 86 The breadth of party control over the process and the 
limited authority and role of judges reflects a general mistrust of 
government, and a need to safeguard the rights and freedom of 
individuals against the perceived risks of abuse of governmental 
power. Additionally, the system prioritizes individual rights over 
communal rights. 87  The heart of adversary adjudication is the 
vindication of the individual rights of the litigants via a court 
battle.88 In this battle, the focus is on individual conflict rather than 
fostering community harmony.89 Consequently, while it may be in 
the best interest of the community to resolve a dispute peacefully 
and quickly, the adversary system prioritizes individual interests 
by ensuring that disputes are resolved based on the most reliable 
evidence, even if this comes with an apparent cost of protracted, 
and at times, irreparable conflict. 
The second set of principal values of the adversary system 
includes those of truth and fairness. 90  The system’s defining 
features, in fact, are designed to promote the discovery of the truth 
regarding a dispute and to enable the impartial decision-maker to 
fairly determine the outcome of the dispute based solely on 
applying established legal principles to the truth surrounding the 
conflict.91 Proponents of the system eschew cooperative dispute 
resolution processes on the grounds that only adverse self-
interested parties will expose and bring to light the truth of a 
dispute.92 Concern for the truth and fairness also mandates that the 
ultimate decision-maker be an impartial party who has no 
relationship with the parties or familiarity with the dispute.93 Only 
disinterested decision-makers are able to come to an honest 
decision by employing a fair and accurate assessment of the 
evidence presented and the law to be applied.94  
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88 Metoui, supra note 15, at 338. 
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D. Assumptions Underlying Adversary System 
 
The adversary legal system is also premised on a number of 
assumptions regarding the nature of human societies and the nature 
of human beings. An easily overlooked assumption is that humans 
and societies benefit from a system that prioritizes individual rights 
at the expense of individual cooperation. The assumption that the 
adversary system benefits society rests upon two fundamental 
ideas. First, freedom is paramount in society. Second, the best way 
to ensure a free society is to safeguard each human’s freedom, 
individually. 
While more obscured, another assumption underlying the 
adversary system is that humans are autonomous.95 The belief in 
individual autonomy is readily apparent when one considers that a 
primary aim of the adversarial system is to protect individual rights 
from intrusions by governments and other individuals. 96  A 
precursor to protecting individual autonomy is, of course, the 
belief that individual autonomy exists.  
The adversary system also assumes that humans behave as 
rational agents who are driven by self-interest. 97  Adversary 
litigation assumes that humans formulate and act in accordance 
with forward-looking strategies designed to optimize solely the 
individual’s own selfish interests.98 This assumption manifests in 
the amount of responsibility the system places on the individual 
disputing parties throughout the adversary process. The momentum 
of the process relies entirely on and requires individuals to pursue 
their own interests. 99  Furthermore, a number of the procedural 
rules governing the adversary dispute process were created on the 
assumption that individuals directly involved in a dispute would 
fight so fiercely for their own self-interest alone that rules must be 
created to keep the process fair.100  
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Dovetailing from the assumption that humans behave rationally 
based on their own selfish interests, is the assumption that human 
behavior can be predicted. Every aspect of the adversary system 
depends for its effectiveness on the proposition that humans 
behave in predictable ways. The assumption of predictability 
works in concert with the assumptions of rationality and self-
interest. Adversary proponents argue that, because humans are 
rational beings who are driven to maximize their selfish interests, 
humans will respond predictably to external variables that either 
enhance or diminish their self-interest.101 For instance, the system 
expects that individuals will be incentivized to pursue adversary 
adjudication when their self-interests have been infringed.102 The 
system predicts that humans will vigorously pursue their cases in 
order to vindicate or maximize their self-interests or in an effort to 
avoid the curtailment of their self-interests. 103 Additionally, the 
system relies on predictable human responses to court decisions. 
Individuals will avoid violating the final decision because of the 
threat to the individual’s self-interest that results from legal 
sanctions accompanying the violation.  
 
E. Collateral Effects 
 
The distinct structure, underlying narrative, values, and 
assumptions of the adversary system have created a number of 
collateral characteristics that also readily distinguish the 
adversarial system from other legal systems. These include the 
system’s general inaccessibility and its reliance on lawyers, the 
limited remedial power of the adversarial system, the interpersonal 
discord produced by the system, and the need for hierarchical 
control.  
First, for a number of reasons, the adversary system has 
evolved to a point where it is not readily accessible to the average 
citizen.104  The adversary system employs extensive procedural 
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and evidentiary rules designed to control the dispute process in 
order to infuse the structure and safeguards into the adversary 
process necessary to enable accurate fact-finding.105 These rules 
are both extensive and largely unintelligible to the average citizen. 
Because most individuals alone cannot successfully navigate the 
rules and the procedures involved with the adversary system, 
attorneys must play a substantial role in the process. 106  The 
prevalence of attorneys in the legal system is another 
distinguishing feature of the adversary system.107 Unfortunately, 
and frequently, individuals are unable to afford the attorneys’ fees 
incurred by litigation.108 Thus, these individuals are unable to use 
the system to resolve their disputes.109 Consequently, the courts, 
while technically open to everyone’s claims, are functionally 
inaccessible to a great portion of the population simply because 
they do not have the means to engage in the adversary process. 
Second, the adversary system is structured to provide litigants 
with limited remedial measures.110 The adversary system pits two 
sides of a dispute against one another in a search for truth to which 
it can apply neutral legal principles in order to obtain a just result. 
However, by forcing disputants to engage in a battle of interests, 
the system creates a zero-sum game in which the only result is that 
one party is the winner while the other party is the loser.111 In this 
system, the neutral decision-maker is limited to issuing an all-or-
nothing decision which, inevitably leaves one of the two parties 
entirely unsatisfied. In addition to being constrained by the win-
lose dynamic created by the binary system, courts are usually 
constrained by the limited remedies they can grant.112 Remedies 
for disputes often come in only a few varieties, such as monetary 
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damages, injunctions, or declaratory judgments.113 Thus, resolution 
of a dispute usually will involve winner-takes-all determination 
accompanied by a remedy that is essentially a one-size-fits-all 
outcome for the winning disputant.114  
Third, individuals who have resolved disputes through the 
adversary system, especially litigation involving an ongoing 
interpersonal conflict, often report that the process of engaging in 
litigation resulted in worsening the interpersonal conflict that gave 
rise to the dispute in the first place.115 The disintegration of the 
relationship between disputants is not entirely unexpected. The 
adversary system emphasizes competition rather than cooperation, 
and the goal of winning the dispute trumps the goal of repairing the 
damage to the underlying relationship. 116  Resolution of the 
interpersonal discord also goes ignored within the adversary 
system when parties to the dispute rarely interact with each other, 
but act instead only through their attorneys.117 Consequently, in 
some respects the procedures and processes of the adversarial 
system further divide the disputants and never really solve their 
underlying conflict. 
Finally, the adversary system operates as a vertical justice 
system, meaning that it relies on hierarchies of power to control the 
administration, enactment, and enforcement of justice. 118  
Adversarial disputes are determined by a third-party, neutral 
decision-maker, such as a judge or jury.119 As such, the disputing 
parties themselves do not participate in the formation of a decision 
regarding the outcome of their dispute. 120  Because this often 
results in at least one party, usually the losing party, being 
unsatisfied, there must be a mechanism in place to ensure that the 
parties do not deviate from the decision based on their own self-
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interest.121 Imposing legal or punitive consequences on individuals 
who fail to conform to the court’s final decision serves as this 
mechanism by giving the court’s judgment the force of law.122  
 
III. PEACEMAKING: NAVAJO PEACEMAKINg IN THE 21st CENTURY 
 
By the mid-1970’s, the acrimonious results of congressional 
actions imposing Western adversarial principles onto Indian justice 
systems were becoming apparent.123 Over generations of federal 
Indian policy, tribal court procedures conformed more and more to 
the United States legal system, while becoming more divorced 
from tribal values. 124  The result was internal conflict and 
dissatisfaction among tribes whose more flexible justice systems 
had been wrestled away from decades of unfavorable federal 
policies.125 
At this time, however, a number of tribes were defying federal 
policies and secretly applying rediscovered tribal customary 
law.126 Also, a number of tribes were making explicit provisions 
for informal dispute resolution processes that employed traditional 
tribal dispute resolution procedures based on tribal conceptions of 
justice.127 Tribal support for the employment of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms was further bolstered by the advent of 
alternative dispute resolution within mainstream Western legal 
culture. 128  These non-adversarial dispute resolution procedures 
came to be known as “peacemaking.”129 The “tribal peacemaking” 
concept was defined as “any system of dispute resolution used 
within a Native American community which utilizes non-
adversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates some traditional or 
customary approaches . . . the aim of which is conciliation and 
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restoration of peace and harmony.”130 Presently, more than one 
hundred tribal court systems employ some form of tribal 
peacemaking for resolving civil disputes.131 
Like the adversary system, the peacemaking process has an 
ascertainable method of operations and an underlying narrative 
regarding how justice is best achieved. Additionally, peacemaking 
reflects certain values and assumptions regarding humans and 
society. The following part examines specific aspects of 
peacemaking and contrasts peacemaking with the adversary system 
for resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Because the Navajo 
Peacemaking Program is “[p]erhaps the foremost example of 
native people resetting the peacemaking foundation,”132 this part 
specifically focuses on the Navajo system as a model for 
peacemaking systems, generally.    
The Navajo Nation has a long history of utilizing peacemaking 
techniques for resolving disputes. Even when Congress was 
attempting to eradicate traditional tribal justice systems by 
imposing C.F.R. courts upon tribes, the Navajos continued to 
secretly utilize peacemaking techniques to resolve interpersonal 
disputes between tribal members. Then, in the early 1980’s, the 
Navajos reformed their judicial systems by formally establishing a 
Peacemakers Court. Currently, every judicial district within the 
Navajo Nation includes a Peacemakers Court that provides 
members with an alternative forum for the resolution of certain 
disputes. This formal recognition of peacemaking through the 
establishment of Peacemaker Courts, in addition to the rich history 
of Navajo peacemaking techniques that endured the federal 
government’s assimilationist efforts, has made the Navajo 
Peacemaking Program one of the most well-developed 
peacemaking systems in the United States.133 As such, the Navajo 
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Peacemaking Program provides an excellent and informative case 
study of the peacemaking process. 
 
A. Method of Operation of Navajo Peacemaking 
 
Navajo peacemaking has a number of defining features that 
make it a unique dispute resolution system. Peacemaking most 
closely resembles the Anglo-American dispute process of 
mediation. 134  While the process can be distinguished from 
adversarial dispute resolution in many ways, there are three major 
operational distinctions between the two dispute resolution 
systems. First, peacemaking encourages cooperative, rather than 
competitive, conflict resolution. 135  Second, in peacemaking, 
conflict is resolved through an agreement that is consensual and 
formulated by the disputants, rather than by a court imposed 
decision.136 Third, peacemaking occurs in the absence of detailed 
governing rules, rather than according to extensive procedural and 
evidentiary designs. 137  The following section addresses these 
distinctions in addition to a number of more nuanced differences 
between the systems that result from these larger divergences.  
 
1. Cooperation Not Competition 
 
One of the most striking differences between the operations of 
the peacemaking and adversarial system employed in tribal courts 
lies in the nature of party dynamics encouraged by the systems. 
The adversary system polarizes disputants by requiring they take 
sharply conflicting positions, and by providing a competitive 
forum for them to engage in a legal battle to advance their 
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positions. 138  Conversely, the peacemaking process employs 
numerous techniques designed to do the exact opposite—bring the 
parties into alignment by fostering an environment of 
cooperation.139  
For example, Navajo peacemaking promotes party cooperation 
through creating a more inclusive process. While the adversary 
process ensures conflict by excluding everyone except the 
individuals directly involved in the dispute, peacemaking allows 
anyone who identifies as an interested person to participate in the 
peacemaking process. 140 By expanding the scope of individuals 
who can participate in the process, Navajo peacemaking increases 
cooperation among disputing parties. 141  Frequently, individuals 
related to a disputant will offer the disputant different perspectives 
on the disputant’s problematic or questionable behavior. 142  By 
allowing more individuals to participate, disputants hear a range of 
perspectives beyond solely those of the individual with whom they 
are disputing. These alternative perspectives encourage the 
disputant to loosen his grip on his version of events and keep an 
open mind regarding how best to proceed in resolving the 
dispute.143  
The scope of topics discussed during peacemaking also fosters 
cooperation between parties. In the adversary system, trial is the 
major dispute resolution event, and is comprised solely of the 
disputants’ differing versions of the factual events surrounding the 
dispute.144 The meat of trial is conflict; each party tries to convince 
the decision-maker to adopt his version of events while also 
attempting to undermine the adverse party’s case. 145  While 
peacemaking certainly affords the disputing parties the 
opportunities to recount their version of the conflict, peacemaking 
is not solely a formal contest regarding which party has the more 
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convincing story. 146  Instead, during the process, Navajo 
peacemakers often steer the conversation toward the guiding 
principles of Navajo teachings or traditions and thereby evoke a 
belief system the parties share.147 By discussing Navajo customs 
and practices with the parties, the peacemaker shifts the discussion 
to topics of common ground. This shift in dialogue–from what the 
parties do not have in common to what they do have in common– 
encourages the parties to view one another with a greater sense of 
camaraderie rather than suspicion and anger.148  
 
2. Consensual Agreement Between Parties 
 
A second operational distinction between Navajo peacemaking 
system and Westernized adversarial adjudication utilized by tribal 
courts is the nature of the resolution achieved. The peacemaking 
process works to develop consensus between the disputing 
parties.149 The process concludes when the parties have formulated 
and agreed to abide by an agreement that resolves the dispute and 
repairs the parties’ relationship.150 The peacemaker, who works 
much like a mediator, is a vital resource to the parties throughout 
this process, and provides them with a respected third-person 
perspective on the dispute and with ideas for reconciliation. 151  
Because there is no phase of the process in which any party, 
including the peacemaker, is either granted exclusive authority or 
entirely divested of authority, all participants in Navajo 
peacemaking exist in egalitarian relationships that enable each 
individual to actively participate throughout every process of 
peacemaking.152 The peacemaking process lies in sharp contrast to 
the adversary system, which establishes an unambiguous division 
of power between the parties, who are given exclusive control over 
                                                                                                                            
146 Ennis et al., supra note 133, at 456-57. 
147 Id. at 460. 
148 Metoui, supra note 15, at 529.  
149 Ennis et al., supra note 130, at 456. 
150 Id. at 460. 
151 Brown, supra note 136, at 46.  








the proceedings and trial, and the decision-maker, who exclusively 
controls the outcome of the dispute.153  
Because parties to a peacemaking draft the agreement resolving 
their dispute, there is no danger that the peacemaker will impose 
upon the parties an unfair outcome based on favoritism or unfair 
dealings. Consequently, although the peacemaker cannot have 
prejudice toward a party or an interest in the outcome of the 
peacemaking, 154  there is no hard and fast requirement that the 
peacemaker remain absolutely objective and neutral at all times 
during the process, unlike there is in the adversary system.155 In 
fact, the peacemaker is expected to offer the disputants a point of 
view grounded in Navajo values, such as harmony, community, 
and solidarity. 156 Peacemakers also often lecture or instruct the 
participants on traditional Navajo teachings relevant to the 
participants’ specific problem. 157  Thus, while the peacemaker 
cannot be partial to a particular disputant, the peacemaker is 
expected to be partial toward the Navajo point of view and to 
continually offer this perspective to the parties throughout the 
peacemaking.158 
 
3. Flexible Framework for Dispute Resolution 
 
While a loose framework of rules governs numerous aspects of 
the peacemaking process, the process is largely designed to afford 
the peacemaker and parties a great deal of flexibility when 
resolving a dispute.159 The rules, devised by the Navajo Nation 
Judicial Council, provide an outline for the process of 
peacemaking and generally pertain to what kind of disputes can be 
resolved by peacemaking, who can serve as a peacemaker and 
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how, and the extent of the peacemaker’s role and 
responsibilities.160 
Peacemaking can be initiated by disputing parties, or the 
Navajo District Court may refer a party to the Peacemaker 
division.161 Any member of the Navajo Nation who is injured, 
hurt, or aggrieved by the actions of another may initiate 
peacemaking.162 Peacemaking typically is used where the parties 
to the dispute are members of the Navajo Tribe and where the 
dispute involves certain personal and community relationships.163 
Once an individual has requested a peacemaking, or the 
District Court has transferred a dispute to the peacemaker division, 
the District Court judge appoints a named Peacemaker to conduct 
peacemaking proceedings. 164  Typically, each Navajo chapter 
selects and certifies to the District Court the individuals who may 
serve as a peacemaker. 165  The rules governing peacemaking 
provide guidelines for who can serve as a peacemaker and what is 
necessary for eligibility. In order to be eligible to serve as a 
peacemaker, a person must have the respect of the community, an 
ability to work with tribal members, a reputation for integrity, 
honesty, humanity, and an ability to resolve local problems.166 The 
rules specify that one does not need to be a government or 
religious leader to serve as a peacemaker, rather, the main thing 
that is desired is that the person chosen will have such respect that 
the people who are asked to solve their problems by agreement 
will listen.167 The clerk of the District Court maintains a roll of 
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peacemakers from which peacemakers are appointed. 168  The 
parties, however, may select their own peacemaker as long as 
everyone agrees to the appointment.  
Although they are not identical, the peacemaking process 
resembles mediation.169 Parties typically sit in a circle and “talk 
things out,” explaining their various interests.170 Members of the 
parties’ community and family provide input during the process. 
Notably, unlike the adversary system, there are no rigid rules about 
what must be discussed and what topics remain off-limits.171 It is 
common for the disputants to discuss how they feel about the 
dispute and what they need in order to come to an agreement.172 
Peacemaking also operates in the absence of rules governing how 
the peacemaker and parties must come to a resolution.173 Instead, 
drafters of the peacemaking rules intentionally omitted procedural 
requirements in order to give peacemakers and parties the 
flexibility to employ whatever resolution procedures best fit the 
situation. 174  While the rules prohibit peacemakers from using 
force, violence, or violating the parties’ rights secured by the 
Navajo Bill of Rights, the peacemakers remain free to “[u]se any 
reasonable means to obtain peaceful, cooperative, and voluntary 
resolution of a dispute subject to peacemaking.”175 
A final noteworthy difference between the rules and 
frameworks for the peacemaking and adversary process is how the 
rules of each system approach conflict generally. One of the 
functions of the procedural and evidentiary rules governing the 
adversarial system is to distill interpersonal conflict into discrete 
legal issues.176 After the conflict has been simplified and broken 
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into its component legal parts, the trial court judge, after discerning 
the factual truths relevant to the legal issues in a case, simply 
applies established legal precedent to reach a decision. 177  
Peacemaking has no analogous procedure. Instead, peacemaking 
takes a flexible approach to conflict and considers more than solely 
the legal aspects of a dispute.178 Peacemaking recognizes both the 
myriad reasons for conflict and the myriad ways conflict affects 
disputants, and the disputants’ families. Individual participants are 
able to express anything they need to express in order to reach 
resolution–little evidence or discussion is excluded.179 Disputants’ 
families are allowed to do the same in order to effectuate 
reconciliation.180 Because peacemaking does not limit participation 
in the dispute resolution process to only those directly involved 
with the dispute, peacemaking approaches the dispute in a holistic 
manner that accounts for the complexity and multi-faceted 
dimension of conflict.  
 
a. Underlying Narrative 
 
The Navajo peacemaking process reflects a narrative about 
how justice is achieved in dispute resolution situations. In contrast 
to the adversary system, peacemaking does not seek to achieve 
justice with mathematical precision by applying neutral legal 
principles to the facts of the dispute. Instead, in peacemaking, 
justice is a function of the goals the process seeks to achieve and 
the means the process employs to achieve them. Peacemaking 
utilizes Navajo justice concepts, such as “equality, consent, talking 
things out, and restoring people to good relations with each other 
in a community,”181 in order to restore unity and harmony among 
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the feuding parties. 182  As a general matter, justice is achieved 
when the disputing parties work cooperatively to come to a 
consensual agreement that resolves their dispute and restores unity 
between the parties and among the greater community. 183  
Consensus, resolution, and cooperation are best achieved not 
through coercion, but by using a peacemaker who has the mutual 
respect of the parties and who can serve as a guide in the 
process.184 The peacemaker guides the process using a variety of 
techniques, including emphasizing the common ground shared by 
the parties, such as shared tribal traditions and beliefs.185  
 
b. Principal Values 
 
The peacemaking process reflects a distinct set of values. 
Primary emphasis is placed on the restoration of community 
solidarity and harmony between the parties. 186  Peacemaking, 
unlike the adversary system, does not give greater weight to 
individual over community affairs. 187  Peacemaking also differs 
from the adversary system by valuing the relationship between 
parties rather than the individual rights of the parties. In so doing, 
the process gives paramount value to reinforcing community and 
interpersonal unity instead of individualism.188 
Peacemaking also places greater value on reaching consensus 
than on reaching the truth.189 In this respect, peacemaking lies in 
sharp contrast to the adversary system. Examining the subjects 
covered during peacemaker discussions reveals how building 
consensus between parties and community members is of critical 
importance to the peacemaking process. As an initial matter, while 
the individual disputants discuss their understanding of the facts of 
the dispute during peacemaking, peacemaking discussions, unlike 
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adversary adjudication, do not revolve solely around the 
disputants’ differing interests and factual accounts of the dispute. 
Throughout the peacemaking process, the peacemaker offers 
insight into how the dispute implicates Navajo stories or traditions 
and seeks to point out where the disputants have common 
ground. 190  As a result, a substantial part of the substance of 
peacemaking focuses on what the disputants share, rather than on 
their divergent interests.191  
Additionally, unlike the adversary system, peacemaking does 
not consider solely the objective facts of a dispute.192 Peacemaking 
recognizes and addresses the emotional dimensions of conflict, as 
well. 193 The peacemaking process recognizes that emotions and 
feelings are just as important as logic and reasoning rather than 
ignoring the emotional needs of disputants like the adversarial 
system. 194  Often, parties’ emotions play an important role in 
peacemaking, as it is often the parties’ expressions of their feelings 
from which the peacemaker discerns the true cause of conflict.195 
Furthermore, expression of emotions and feelings enables both 
participants in the peacemaking to understand the full 
consequences of their actions.196   
 
c. Underlying Assumptions 
 
Like the adversary system, peacemaking proceeds according to 
a number of assumptions about the nature of humans and the 
nature of human societies. A fundamental assumption underlying 
the peacemaking system is that individuals benefit from a system 
that focuses on relationships between individuals rather than on the 
actual individual. Navajo peacemaking places greater value on 
restoring relationships rather than restoring an individual’s ability 
                                                                                                                            
190 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 133, at 458. 
191 See Brown, supra note 136, at 45.  
192 Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 133, at 458. 
193  Philmer Bluehouse et al., Hozhooji Naat’aanii: The Navajo Justice and 
Harmony Ceremony, 10 Mediation Q. 327, 333 (1993). 
194 Bradford, supra note 5, at 581. 
195 Id. 








to exercise his rights.197 Consequently, in terms of how to provide 
maximum benefit to individuals and society, the assumptions upon 
which the adversary and peacemaking systems rely are inversely 
related. While the adversary system relies on the proposition that 
providing benefit to an individual will benefit the community, the 
peacemaking system relies on the assumption that benefits to 
collective humans will ultimately benefit the individual.  
A second and closely related assumption inherent in the 
peacemaking system is that Navajo tribal members do not exist as 
autonomous agents. Instead, peacemaking assumes that individuals 
are bonded to one another through “solidarity.” 198  The Navajo 
understanding of “solidarity” recognizes that an individual exists at 
one with his physical environment, family, community, and the 
cosmos.199 Peacemaking is a critical process to the Navajo as it 
restores good relations among people.200 
A third assumption underlying the peacemaking process is that 
humans are dynamic creatures, motivated by a number of forces, 
and capable of engaging in cooperative behavior at the expense of 
their own self-interests. In contrast to the adversary system, which 
assumes that humans are motivated solely by a desire to maximize 
their own self-interest,201 the peacemaker system contemplates a 
much more dynamic ideal of what it means to be human. 
Peacemaking operates by fostering cooperation rather than 
competition.202 The operation of the system depends entirely on 
the idea that humans can be motivated by a desire to cooperate and 
compromise with another person, rather than solely by competition 
and winning. Additionally, peacemaking assumes that human 
feelings are motivators of human behavior. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that a necessary part of peacemaking involves the 
participants sharing their feelings about the dispute. 203  
Peacemaking also rests on the assumption that people can be 
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motivated by respect for others, as the peacemaker is expected to 
facilitate the resolution of the dispute in the absence of legal 
authority over the disputing parties.204  
 
d. Collateral Effects 
 
The methods of operation, narrative, values, and assumptions 
associated with peacemaking collectively create a number of 
additional features that characterize the peacemaking process. 
These include the system’s accessibility and the absence of 
lawyers;205 the creation of win-win solutions;206 strengthening of 
Navajo communities; 207  and the establishment of a horizontal 
justice system, or a system of justice that does not rely on 
hierarchies of power to influence human behavior and in which no 
person is above another person.208 
In comparison to the adversary adjudication process, 
peacemaking has become an incredibly accessible method for 
resolving certain kinds of disputes. 209  This difference in 
accessibility can be attributed to a number of factors. First, 
comprehension of the rules governing the peacemaking procedures 
and goals does not demand a law degree. The peacemaking rules 
are written in both plain language and legalese.210 As such, the 
rules are designed to inform and educate people about the process 
and its availability. Second, unlike adversary adjudication, there 
are no court costs associated with peacemaking. The process 
requires only that the parties pay to the peacemaker thirty dollars 
for the peacemaker’s time. 211  Third, except for a few narrow 
circumstances, the process prohibits the use of lawyers. 212  
Peacemaking relies on the parties’ cooperation and consensus 
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building, which requires the parties to directly communicate with 
one another about personal matters.213  
Moreover, unlike the adversary system, which always results in 
a win-lose outcome, the peacemaking process often becomes a 
non-zero-sum game. That is, participants frequently devise creative 
win-win solutions.214 This is largely a function of the flexibility 
and relational equality that is built into the peacemaking 
process.215  
The peacemaking rules intentionally omit reference to how 
peacemaking must be performed. 216  Because there is no set 
procedure governing how parties must come to a solution, the 
parties are able to discuss a number of different alternative 
solutions to the dispute.217 Further, because the participants and the 
peacemakers are equals, and because disputants’ family and 
friends are permitted to give their input throughout the process, 
peacemaking frequently involves a large group of minds 
collectively searching for a solution that will benefit everyone 
involved. Finally, because peacemaking is based on Navajo 
traditions and customs and does not involve the application of 
fixed laws to the facts of the dispute, there is no one right answer 
to the question posed by the dispute. Removing the requirement 
that the dispute must be resolved with certainty, correctness, and 
according to precedent allows the parties to the peacemaking an 
unlimited number of options when devising solutions. 
Another collateral effect of the peacemaking process is that it 
has positively impacted the Navajo communities in two major 
ways. First, the peacemaking process often strengthens and 
restores the relationship between the disputing parties.218 Unlike 
the adversary system, in which the parties never attempt to repair 
their relationship, a primary goal of peacemaking is to resolve and 
end the parties’ conflict. Second, Navajo tradition and customs are 
protected and reinforced through peacemaking as a result of their 
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use in resolving disputes. 219  Peacemakers often seek to guide 
parties to common ground by initiating discussions about Navajo 
beliefs or traditions the parties share. In doing this, the peacemaker 
reminds everyone participating in the peacemaking of Navajo 
customs. 220  The collective effects of the many annual 
peacemakings are a strengthening of the Navajo knowledge of and 
appreciation for the Nation’s customs.221  
Finally, peacemaking operates as a horizontal justice system, 
meaning that it is grounded in equality between the participants.222 
In peacemaking, the parties are not given authority over the 
peacemaker or each other. 223 Likewise, the peacemaker has no 
legal authority over the parties and cannot force them to resolve 
their dispute.224 Furthermore, while parties have the option to have 
the Navajo District Court certify their peacemaking agreements as 
judgments carrying the force of law, most parties opt not to involve 
the court. 225  Instead, they choose to honor the peacemaking 
resolution in the absence of official legal enforcement. In 
peacemaking, the importance of group solidarity, and respect for 
the peacemaker take the place of the force and coercion employed 
by the adversary system.226  
 
IV. DUELING DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS AND COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THEORY 
 
A. Two Distinct Dispute Resolution Systems 
 
Peacemaking and adversarial litigation are the two widely 
divergent dispute resolution processes that Indian tribes use to 
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resolve interpersonal civil disputes today.227 While peacemaking 
has been gaining popularity in recent years, the majority of 
disputes on reservations are still resolved in tribal courts pursuant 
to some version of the Anglo-American adversary method.228   
Some contemporary scholars, however, have advanced strong 
policy arguments supporting the conclusion that peacemaking, 
rather than the adversarial tradition employed in tribal courts, 
should be the primary mechanism by which tribal members resolve 
conflict.229 The crux of the argument supporting a peacemaking 
preference is the fact that peacemaking strengthens 
communities. 230  Advocates of the process assert that tribal 
communities are benefited by using a dispute resolution system 
that promotes values such as community wellbeing and the 
importance of relational harmony.231 Additionally, scholars argue 
that utilization of the adversary system promotes values, such as 
individualism and autonomy, that are not only antithetical to tribal 
values, but that also undermine a tribe’s sense of community and 
general wellbeing.232 
While some scholars argue that the adversarial system eats 
away at tribal communities, other scholars argue that the key to 
strengthening tribal communities is strengthening the Anglo-
American justice procedures utilized by tribal courts. These 
scholars posit that the sovereignty of tribal communities depends 
on state and federal courts recognizing tribal court decisions.233 
Demonstrating greater fidelity to the Anglo-American legal 
practices will give tribal courts the legitimacy they will need in 
order to receive the comity necessary for tribal sovereignty.234 As 
such, there are many scholars who support tribal courts’ use of 
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Western adversarial legal traditions and propose that the courts 
adhere to Anglo-American procedures even more rigidly.235  
Both sides of the debate offer persuasive arguments for their 
opposing positions. However, the scholars are not divided on every 
issue. Those advocating for greater reliance on peacemaking and 
those advocating for stronger Western traditions in tribal courts 
share at least one common goal. Both camps aspire to ensure that 
tribal dispute resolution systems enhance the wellbeing of tribal 
communities. The following part of this article seeks to add insight 
to the debate by examining not the policy reflected by preferring a 
particular dispute resolution system, but by examining the relative 
effectiveness of the peacemaking and adversarial justice systems. 
The analysis included in the following section relies on two 
basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that the wellbeing of tribal 
communities is affected not only by the policy furthered in 
choosing to prefer a specific dispute resolution system, but also by 
the effectiveness of the chosen dispute resolution system. In other 
words, in order to truly benefit tribal communities, the dispute 
resolution system must effectively resolve conflict between tribal 
members. Second, it is assumed that the dispute resolution system 
that best responds to the dynamics of human social systems, as 
defined by scientific theory, will be a more advantageous strategy 
for dispute resolution. 
Based on these assumptions, the first section of this part first 
considers the dynamics governing human social systems as 
explained by complex adaptive systems theory. The features and 
principles with implications for legal systems are also explored. 
The second section of this part then analyzes the relative 
effectiveness of each dispute resolution system in terms of how 
each best adapts and responds to human social systems. This part 
ultimately concludes that, because the peacemaking system is 
better adapted to the workings of human social dynamics, 
peacemaking is a more effective and consequently the preferable 
method of dispute resolution.  
 
                                                                                                                            








B. Using Complex Adaptive Systems Theory to Analyze Competing 
Dispute Resolution Methods 
 
1. Overview of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory 
 
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory is a field of study that 
has been used to understand and explain the behavior of a number 
of complex phenomenon, from ecosystems to the human immune 
system to the weather, all of which are considered “complex 
adaptive systems.”236 Despite their widely divergent natures, CAS 
share a number of similar properties and features, and behave 
according to the same general dynamics. Like an anthill or the 
human brain, groups of humans or human social systems also 
function as complex adaptive systems. 237 Consequently, human 
social systems exhibit the same organizing principles, dynamics, 
and properties as other CAS found throughout the rest of nature.238  
The understanding that human social systems function as CAS 
has major implications for a number of fields, especially the law—
specifically, dispute resolution. The subject matter on which the 
law acts is human behavior, and, in the case of dispute resolution 
laws, it is human conflict. If CAS theory can shed light on the 
dynamics and properties of human social systems and the 
relationships between the individual human components, then we 
can assess the relative effectiveness of dispute resolution 
procedures by comparing how well adapted the dispute resolution 
system is to the CAS dynamics of human societies. Furthermore, it 
is safe to assume that a dispute resolution system that fails to 
accommodate the nature of the dynamics of human societies, 
ultimately will be less effective than a system that does 
accommodate the dynamic ways that human systems behave.  
An effective way to define complex adaptive systems is to 
break apart the words included in the term “complex adaptive 
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systems.” First, a “system” is anything comprised of two or more 
agents that interact.239 A system is considered a “complex” system 
when the system includes a large number of agents that not only 
interact with each other, but also exist in interdependent 
relationships with one another and their environment. 240  
Interdependence means that the agents of the system influence and 
are influenced by one another.241  
A complex adaptive system displays two additional properties: 
“emergence” and “adaptability.” 242  “Emergence” refers to the 
process by which large-scale, system level behaviors emerge as a 
result of the self-organization of and relationships between 
individual agents. 243  For example, in human systems, political 
parties, the economy, and language all constitute “emergent” 
behaviors. 244  Systems demonstrate “adaptability” when these 
emergent behaviors are capable of actually changing in response 
to, or adapting to, stimuli from the environment.245 The ability of 
political parties to change in response to changing social norms, 
over the course of time, is an example of an “adaptable emergent” 
behavior that human social systems demonstrate. 
CAS also share a number of defining characteristics that 
separate them from other kinds of systems. As an initial matter, 
CAS defy reductionist logic.246 This means that one cannot attempt 
to understand the system by breaking it into its basic component 
parts and subsequently studying the behavior of the parts.247 CAS 
are greater than the sum of their parts, and at the whole-system 
level exhibit an array of properties that are not expressed by any of 
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the component parts. 248  Additionally, one cannot seek to fully 
understand the working of a system’s component part by removing 
it from the system and studying its behaviors.249 Any part of the 
system can only be understood fully when it is considered along 
with the historical, environmental, and social context within which 
the part exists.250  
These principles suggest that human societies cannot be 
understood by examining the behavior of single individuals. 
Consequently, while a single individual may display a wide array 
of behaviors, a single individual will never completely capture the 
breadth of behaviors exhibited by the system itself. They also 
suggest that a single human being likely cannot be understood 
outside of the context of the relationships within which the human 
being exists. The human’s behavior is largely defined as a result of 
social and environmental relationships and constraints. To 
understand the operation and behavior of a single human, the 
human must be studied in relation to its environmental and social 
context. Finally, the principles indicate that conflict, itself, cannot 
be understood when it is separated from the historical, 
environmental, and social context in which it arose. 
A second feature of CAS is that they are highly unpredictable 
as a result of the non-linear relationships between their component 
parts.251 CAS are comprised of diverse component parts interacting 
in a diverse array of relationships, responding to one another and 
their environment.252 The complexity of the interactions involved 
in CAS renders the system subject to non-linear dynamics and 
unpredictability.253 Non-linearity means that small changes to the 
system at the component level can yield disproportionately large 
changes within the system at the system level. 254  Because of 
CAS’s non-linearity, the system’s long-term behavior is inherently 
unpredictable.255  
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That human social systems exhibit non-linear and 
unpredictable dynamics has important legal implications, 
especially for dispute resolution. The unpredictability of human 
social systems suggests that dispute resolution systems should 
remain flexible and adaptable in order to respond to unexpected 
behavior from human subjects.256 Additionally, given the inherent 
unpredictability in complex human social systems, laws and 
policies should not be based on the assumption that human systems 
can always be governed effectively by rigid sets of rules.257   
Another notable feature is that CAS are comprised of a large 
number of diverse semi-autonomous component parts, and the 
resiliency of the system itself is a function of the relationships 
among its individual component parts.258 In order for CAS to be 
sufficiently adaptable to maintain its existence in the face of 
environmental disturbances, there must be sufficiently close 
relationships among the system’s component parts. 259  This 
principle suggests that for human systems, social cohesion and the 
quality of relationships between individuals directly impacts the 
ability of human communities to survive external disruptions or 
change.  
A final feature of CAS is that they actually are strengthened 
through disturbance and change.260 Internal and external change or 
disturbance is inherent in the operation of the system, and 
responding to disturbance results in increasing the system’s 
resiliency and adaptability in the face of even greater change.261 
Consequently, the introduction of disturbance or change within a 
system is actually beneficial to the system.262 The implication for 
human systems of this CAS characteristic is that internal and 
external conflict that disturbs human social systems is not 
necessarily an aberrant phenomenon that should be viewed 
negatively or with surprise. Instead, conflict among individuals 
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within a social system is to be continually expected and resolved 
on an ongoing basis. 
 
2. Application of CAS Theory to the Adversary and Peacemaking 
Systems 
 
When using systems theory to analyze the relative 
effectiveness of peacemaking versus the Western adversarial 
approach to dispute resolution, a clear pattern emerges: 
peacemaking is better adapted to the complex, adaptive social 
dynamics of human societies, and as such, peacemaking is likely 
more capable of serving as an effective dispute resolution system 
than the Western adversarial tradition. Peacemaking is better 
equipped to deal with the dynamics of human social systems for a 
number of reasons.  
First, peacemaking approaches conflict and the individuals 
involved from a holistic rather than reductionist standpoint.263 As 
such, peacemaking more effectively evaluates conflict and what is 
needed for consensual resolution. For example, peacemaking 
allows anyone who has an interest in a conflict to be a party to a 
peacemaking.264 As a result, family members and close friends of 
disputants routinely participate in the process. 265  Peacemaking 
approaches conflict holistically by including all of the parties who 
are affected by a conflict, and by ensuring that all of the 
repercussions of the main conflict are considered when coming to a 
resolution, even if these repercussions were felt by those other than 
actual disputants. The Western adversarial system is just the 
opposite, as it allows only those immediately affected by the 
conflict to participate in the litigation.266 Excluding everyone other 
than the parties directly involved simplifies the conflict. It also 
approaches resolution of the entire conflict by considering only a 
fractional representation of the parties affected by the conflict. 
Because the effects of the conflict are never fully apprehended, the 
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solution devised by the adversary system likely fails to completely 
resolve the original problem. 
Another way that peacemaking reflects holistic thinking is the 
essentially limitless scope of issues that can be considered when 
resolving a dispute.267 Parties to a peacemaking are permitted to 
discuss anything they need to discuss in order to resolve a dispute 
and often engage in dialogues that would otherwise be excluded in 
an adversarial context. 268  Furthermore, in peacemaking all 
contributing factors to the conflict including environmental, social, 
and historical factors, are examined to address the underlying 
issues that precipitated the problem. 269 In addition, the mental, 
spiritual, and emotional well-being of all of the participants is 
addressed.270  
Western adversarial litigation, on the other hand, takes an 
entirely different approach to conflict. The adversarial system 
breaks conflict down into fragmented component legal parts and 
addresses solely the legal aspects of a dispute. 271  Adversarial 
litigation also largely excludes the historical and contextual 
evidence framing the dispute.272 The adversary system approaches 
conflict by removing it from the context in which it arises, and by 
breaking it into smaller pieces in order to understand its larger 
whole. This approach is quintessentially reductionist. Again, 
because conflict is a part of a complex adaptive human social 
system that cannot be understood through reductionist methods,273 
the adversary system fails to properly assess the problem. As a 
result, it is likely not as effective at finding an effective solution. 
Peacemaking is also better adapted than the adversarial system 
to dispute resolution in complex human systems, because 
peacemaking accounts for the fact that individual human behaviors 
and relationship dynamics are often unpredictable. Peacemaking 
accommodates this reality by employing flexible procedures for 
the dispute resolution process that allow for whatever tangential 
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discussions and creative solutions are required to reach the 
resolution between the parties. 274  Conversely, the adversarial 
system follows extensive and rigid procedural and evidentiary 
rules that define every aspect of the dispute resolution process.275 
This rigid order often comes at the expense of allowing the parties 
to fully explore what they need to resolve their dispute, because 
often what the parties need cannot be precisely predicted at the 
outset. Because the flexibility inherent in peacemaking makes the 
process capable of responding to the unpredictability of human 
social systems and individual human behavior, peacemaking is 
better able to adjust to meet the evolving needs of the participating 
parties necessary for reaching a consensual solution. 
Another way peacemaking is better adapted to the dynamics of 
human social systems is that peacemaking, unlike the adversary 
system, functions not to vindicate individual rights, but rather to 
restore relationships.276 CAS theory has established that a system’s 
ability to endure requires sufficiently close relationships among a 
system’s component parts. 277 The resiliency and adaptability of 
human social systems to withstand change and continue thriving is 
directly related to the cohesion between the systems parts278–i.e. 
the relationships among the humans in the social system. 
Peacemaking focuses on restoring these relationships, first and 
foremost. Conversely, the adversarial method never actually 
aspires to resolve the conflict between the parties. Instead, 
resolving the interpersonal conflict between the parties is an 
afterthought to the primary goal of determining and validating the 
legal rights of the parties to the dispute.279 
One final way in which peacemaking is more adapted to the 
dynamics of human social systems is the fact that dynamic change 
and conflict inherent in social systems, and actually, at reasonable 
levels, make communities stronger. The adversarial system is not 
adapted to the fact that conflict is inherent in CAS, and the fact that 
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the continual resolution of disturbance within a CAS makes the 
CAS more resilient in the long run. This is demonstrated by the 
adversarial system’s inaccessibility, which has the effect of making 
the process completely unattainable by parties whose conflict often 
goes unresolved.280 While there is no principle in the adversarial 
system that directly denies access to the courts, the courts today are 
far more inaccessible than peacemaking. Because peacemaking is 
so simple, inexpensive, and accessible to the average person,281 it 
is a dispute resolution system capable of handling the dynamic and 
ongoing change that is inherent in human complex adaptive 
systems. 
A pattern emerges when using CAS theory as a lens through 
which to analyze and assess the adversarial and peacemaking 
dispute resolution systems. Traditional peacemaking methods, such 
as those employed by the Navajo Nation, are far better adapted 
than the adversarial system to the complexity of human social 
systems. Given its superior adaptability to human social dynamics, 
it is reasonable to conclude that peacemaking processes are more 
successful than Western adversarial processes at resolving 
interpersonal disputes. Given its greater effectiveness, 
peacemaking can likely provide benefits to tribal communities that 
employment of the adversarial system cannot.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the greatest assimilationist feats of the United States 
was to inculcate Anglo-American legal traditions such as 
adversarial litigation in tribal justice systems. Despite this 
influence, many tribes have retained or reintroduced traditional 
dispute resolution methods, or peacemaking, as a part of their 
current legal practices when resolving interpersonal disputes 
among tribal members.282 Tribes utilizing both peacemaking and 
adversarial litigation have dual justice systems that reflect largely 
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divergent values and assumptions. 283  Although peacemaking is 
gaining momentum, tribes still employ the Western adversarial 
system more frequently when resolving disputes between 
members.284 While scholars have weighed in on the desirability of 
continuing to use adversarial practices in tribal courts, the 
effectiveness of each system must also be considered when 
assessing which dispute resolution model to primarily rely. 
Because traditional peacemaking is better adapted to human social 
dynamics, peacemaking is likely more effective at restoring 
relationships and resolving interpersonal conflict. Given the 
importance of utilizing the most effective dispute resolution system 
when resolving interpersonal civil disputes among tribal members, 
peacemaking could possibly provide greater benefits to tribal 
communities than utilization of the adversarial system.  
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